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CAN SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY AID THE COMPARATIVE LAWYER IN 
UNDERSTANDING LEGAL KNOWLEDGE? 
 
GEOFFREY SAMUEL* 
Kent Law School 
 
 
What is it to have knowledge of law? And what kind of knowledge is legal 
knowledge? These may seem rather extraordinary questions given that law 
has existed as a university discipline for a millennium and there has been a 
distinct legal profession for nearly as long.1 Indeed if one includes Ancient 
Rome one is doubling the time period.2 In addition there exists now a vast 
theory literature on the nature, concept and philosophy of law which, one 
might think, would have exhaustively supplied answers to the knowledge 
questions. Yet for the comparative lawyer the law school syllabi and the 
plurality of theories are not always that helpful because the question of what 
actually amounts to legal knowledge can be elusive. Now, in saying this, one 
is not suggesting that there has been an absence of reflection on the part of 
lawyers and jurists of what it is to have legal knowledge.3 But there have, 
                                       
*Professor Emeritus, Kent Law School. This article was first presented as a paper to the 
Private International Law as Global Governance (PILAGG) seminar at Sciences Po Paris in 
November 2017. The author would like to thank the participants of this seminar for their 
helpful comments, observations and criticisms, with a special thanks to Catalina 
Avasilencei (discussant) and Horatia Muir Watt. Thanks also to several anonymous referees 
whose comments and criticisms were particularly helpful with regard to the formulation of 
the final draft of the manuscript. 
1 See Brundage, J (2008) The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession University of Chicago 
Press. 
2 On which see Schiavone, A (2017) Ius. L'invenzione del diritto in Occidente [The Invention 
of  Law in the West] (2nd ed) Einaudi.  
3 Some notable more recent UK publications are Siems, M (2011) ‘A World Without Law 
Professors’ in Van Hoecke, M (ed) (2011) Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of 
Method for Which Kind of Discipline? Hart Publishing 71 (plus references therein); Bix, B 
(2003) ‘Law As An Autonomous Discipline’ in Cane, P and Tushnet, M (eds) (2003) The 
Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies Oxford University Press 975; Bell, J (2003) ‘Legal 
Education’ in Cane, P and Tushnet, M (eds) (2003) The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies 
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perhaps, been theories or notions of legal knowledge that have so dominated 
legal thinking and discourse that more reflective thinking about legal 
knowledge—indeed about knowledge in general—has been side-lined from 
legal discourse in academic institutions. Outside the legal discipline, social 
scientists have been asking questions about the nature of disciplines, 4 
about whether social science knowledge is cumulative, 5  about the 
differences been academic and non-academic knowledge,6 about the role of 
paradigms and the existence (or not) of scientific revolutions, about the 
validation of assertions and about other fundamental issues that seem of 
vital relevance to subjects such as sociology, anthropology, psychology and 
history.7 Yet jurists seem on the whole absent from these debates. This 
absence is unhelpful for comparative lawyers because all pervading legal 
theories, together with long-established syllabi often having their sources 
directly or indirectly in Roman law, 8  can result in generating negative 
attitudes towards other cultural traditions whose motion of 'law' may be 
different.9 So can one get beyond the established theories and syllabi in 
order to find some deeper identifiers of legal knowledge? 
INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS AND PROMISES 
So, what is it to have legal knowledge? One way of answering this question 
is of course to look at the syllabi of university law faculties and professional 
                                                                                                                       
Oxford University Press 901. 
4 Boutier, J ; Passeron, J-C and Revel, J (eds) (2006) Qu’est-ce qu’une discipline? [What is a 
Discipline?]] Éditions de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales.  
5 Walliser, B (ed) (2009) La cumulativité du savoir en sciences sociales [Cumulativity in the 
Social Sciencess ] Éditions de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. 
6 Walliser, B (ed) (2015) La distinction des savoirs [The Distinction Between Knowledges] 
Éditions de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. 
7 For many of the topics mentioned see generally Mesure, S and Savidan, P (eds) (2006) Le 
dictionnaire des sciences humaines [Dictionary of the Human Sciences] Presses 
Universitaires de France. See also Berthelot, J-M (ed) (2001) Épistémologie des sciences 
sociales [Epistemology of the Social Sciences] Presses Universitaires de France. 
8 See generally Gordley, J (2013) The Jurists: A Critical History Oxford University Press. 
9 Note in particular the work of Teemu Ruskola: Ruskola, T (2002) ‘Legal Orientalism’ (101) 
Michigan Law Review 179. Ruskola has adapted Edward Said's critique of Western 
attitudes towards the East and argues that some Western comparative lawyers are guilty of 
orientalism: Said, E (1978) Orientalism Routledge & Keegan Paul. Sir Christopher Frayling 
has described an aspect of orientalism as ‘the colonial, white, public school view of Chinese 
people’: Frayling, C (2014) The Yellow Peril Thames and Hudson at 13. 
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law schools.10 What do students taking academic and professional exams (or 
other forms of assessment) need to study in order to be able to call 
themselves lawyers?11 Another possibility is to adopt a diachronic approach. 
What has legal knowledge traditionally been? Both of these approaches are 
fundamental to an understanding of what constitutes legal knowledge in 
terms of material to be learned and certain methods to be adopted, but they 
do not necessarily give expression to some underlying epistemological issues 
that often seem to emerge obliquely. For example they may emerge in 
debates about the nature and goals of ‘private law’ or in arguments about 
legal theory or legal education or, again, in disputes about legal taxonomy.12 
Indeed the scope and perimeters of legal knowledge are not just for the 
academics; fundamental questions can be provoked by developments in the 
world of practice and commerce. 13  What kind of knowledge does the 
mediator or negotiator need in order to be good at what he or she does? And 
is such knowledge legal knowledge? In fact does one actually have to know 
much ‘law’ in order to be a good ‘lawyer’?14 If one sees dispute resolution as 
central to law as a notion or discipline, is all knowledge about dispute 
resolution legal knowledge? Cultural issues also raise acute questions about 
the nature of legal knowledge. Are norms and customs arising out of 
indigenous cultures just issues of ‘fact’ or are they a legitimate aspect of 
legal knowledge?15 In addition to these questions there are a range of others 
raising issues about the methods, focal points (institutional and 
conceptual), theories and role of law as a discipline or form knowledge.16 
                                       
10  On which see Birks, P (ed) (1992) Examining the Law Syllabus: The Core Oxford 
University Press; Birks, P (ed) (1993) Examining the Law Syllabus: Beyond the Core Oxford 
University Press; Birks, P (ed) (1994) Reviewing Legal Education Oxford University Press; 
Birks, P (ed) (1996) Pressing Problems in the Law: Volume 2: What Are Law Schools For? 
Oxford University Press. 
11  See further Bell ‘Legal Education’ supra note 3 and Siems ‘A World Without Law 
Professors’ supra note 3. 
12 See eg Samuel, G (2000) ‘Can Gaius Really be Compared to Darwin?’ (49) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 297. 
13 Bell (2003) ‘Legal Education’ supra note 3 at 908–909. 
14 See eg <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uMR1NIEifWM>. 
15 See eg Provost, R (ed) (2017) Culture in the Domains of Law Cambridge University Press. 
16 See further Bix ‘Law As An Autonomous Discipline’ supra note 3. 
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 Following on from these questions, there is little doubt that any 
attempt to assert in some kind of definitive way what legal knowledge is will 
face a number of ‘legal knowledge paradoxes’. These paradoxes will in turn 
often tempt the legal scholar to fall back on the traditional notions and 
concepts (most of which have come directly or indirectly from Roman law: 
the ‘Roman’ conception) that form the institutional knowledge basis of much 
of what lawyers learn in the classroom and of what judges usually use for 
their reasoning and justification.17 Yet if the comparative law scholar does 
fall back on these notions and concepts is he or she in danger of indulging 
in what might be described as epistemological imperialism (or colonialism)? 
Indeed, it could equally amount to a form of actual geopolitical imperialism 
if, for instance, Western commercial laws are forced upon emerging trading 
nations. And, paradoxically, such imperialism in turn will mask the highly 
important methodological and theory connections that law, even the ‘Roman’ 
conception of law as a discipline, enjoys with other disciplines within social 
science. In other words in over-emphasising traditional legal models more 
general forms of social science knowledge can so easily be eclipsed.18 
 One aspect, therefore, of legal epistemology is its fundamental 
interdisciplinary orientation. 19  If it is to be a serious subject for the 
comparatist it must form part of the discipline of epistemology in general 
which in turn will require that the legal epistemologist be familiar with the 
issues and debates in the epistemology of the natural and social sciences. 
Moreover legal epistemology must not just be informed by work in other 
areas but, if it is to be intellectually dynamic, itself must inform work 
                                       
17 See generally Gordley The Jurists: A Critical History supra note 8. 
18 A good illustration is statutory interpretation which in the common law tradition has 
been reduced to three rules, namely the literal, golden and mischief rules. These formal 
rules mask the complex epistemological schemes of intelligibility and paradigm orientations 
that come into play when interpreting and applying texts. 
19 This is very evident in the work of Christian Atias: see eg Atias, C (2002) Épistémologie 
juridique [Legal Epistemology] Dalloz. Note also Ian Maclean's comment: ‘The Corpus Juris 
Civilis itself [...] is not methodologically self-sufficient: a solid grounding in grammar, logic 
and legal argument is presupposed’: Maclean, I (1992) Interpretation and Meaning in the 
Renaissance Cambridge University Press at 68. 
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outside of law.20 It follows from this that in order to investigate the nature of 
legal knowledge one cannot operate uniquely from within law so to speak; 
there is a need to stand outside the discipline in order to bring to bear on 
the object of investigation notions, schemes, theories and methods that 
make up the discipline of epistemology itself. One must, as will be seen, 
stand outside the authority paradigm.21 However such a stance finds itself 
in conflict with those legal theorists who approach legal theory from what 
might be described as an internal point of view.22 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACHES 
Armed with an interdisciplinary outlook the epistemologist keen to discover 
what it is to have knowledge of law can adopt one (or more) of several 
approaches. There is, as Blanché has said, the dichotomy between a 
philosophic and a scientific approach. 23  Another approach is one that 
attempts to grasp a science as it is, divorced so to speak from any temporal 
dimension.24 This is the synchronic viewpoint. What are the models used by 
scientists today? How do they relate to the objects that they are designed to 
represent? What is the present state of a particular science and what is its 
relationship with the empirical world? Here the emphasis is often on the 
preciseness of the scientific language employed in relation to the empirical 
phenomenon which is the object of the language. ‘Scientific knowledge of the 
kind concerned with experience of the real world’, wrote Gilles-Gaston 
Granger, ‘always consists of constructing abstract schemes or models of this 
                                       
20  See on this issue Siems ‘academic dinner party test’: Siems ‘A World Without Law 
Professors’ supra note 3 at 82. 
21 On the authority paradigm see: Samuel, G (2009) ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Authority 
Paradigm: Should Law Be Taken Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists?’ (36) Journal 
of Law and Society 431. 
22 This can be serious, in terms of an academic career, in France: see Jamin, C (2006) ‘La 
construction de la pensée juridique française: interrogation s sur un modèle original à 
l’aune de son anti-modèle’ in De Béchillon, D; Champeil-Desplats, V ; Brunet, P and 
Millard, E (eds) (2006) L’architecture du droit – Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Michel 
Troper [The Architecture of the law - Essays in Honour of Michel Troper] Economica 501 at 
507. 
23 Blanché, R (1983) L'épistémologie [Epistemology ] (3rd ed) Presses Universitaires de France 
at 29–33. 
24 Ibid at 33–36. 
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experience, and to exploit, by means of logic and mathematics, the relations 
between the abstract elements of these models, so as to infer in the end 
properties corresponding with sufficient precision to the empirical properties 
directly observable.’25 It is these models that act as the object of scientific 
knowledge and thus provide a synchronic vision of what it is to have such 
knowledge. One area of controversy with respect to these models is their 
epistemological status. Do they reflect the physical world as it is? Do they, 
in other words, have a ‘truth’ value? Or are they simply intellectual 
constructions to be judged in terms of their usefulness? Are they, in short, 
to be treated only ‘as if’ they represent truth?26 
 In contrast to this synchronic approach there is the diachronic which 
has been described by Blanché as an analyse historico-critique. 27  The 
importance of the historical approach, as Blanché said, is that it ‘offers a 
good means of analysis in separating, by the date and by the circumstances 
of their appearance, the various elements which have contributed to form 
little by little the notions and principles of... science.’28 It is not, as this 
author equally stresses, just a matter of setting out a history of science; a 
diachronic epistemological approach is not an end but a means to 
understanding the elements which have come together to form the scientific 
ideal.29 Nevertheless a separation between the two disciplines is not always 
easy. However while history largely concerns itself with the linking of events 
by cause, the epistemologist is more concerned with the development of 
ideas which are not determined in the same way by causal factors. Their 
history cannot be described but only seized in a manner that is more of a 
                                       
25 Granger, G-G (1995), La science et les sciences [Science and the Sciences] (2nd ed) Presses 
Universitaires de France at 70. 
26 See Bouriau, C (2013) Le ‘comme si’: Kant, Vaihinger et le fictionalisme [The 'As If': Kant, 
Vaihinger and Fictionalism] Les Éditions du Cerf. And see of course Kuhn, T (1970) The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) University of Chicago Press.  
27  Blanché L'épistémologie supra note 23 at 33–39. This ‘as if’ approach to law is 
investigated further in Samuel, G (2015) ‘Is Law a Fiction?’ in Del Mar, M and Twining, W 
(eds) (2015) Legal Fiction in Theory and Practice Springer 31. 
28 Ibid at 36. 
29 Ibid at 37. 
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philosophical than historical exercise.30 The danger here is that a diachronic 
approach can oscillate between an anecdotal listing of great names (a little 
like a history of great kings and queens) or it can simply coalesce into a 
more general philosophical approach.31 
 However, this said, the twentieth century saw a major resurgence of 
the diachronic approach with, first, the work of Gaston Bachelard and, 
secondly, with the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.32 Both of these scientific writers offered an historical view of 
science that was in contrast to the image of science as one of linear 
progress. Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) presented a vision of scientific 
development as a matter of overcoming epistemological obstacles,33 while 
Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) saw science in terms of periodic revolutions 
resulting in what he called changes of paradigm. Kuhn’s book has had an 
enormous impact not just within and around the disciplines of the natural 
sciences but also on epistemological thinking in general. The three notions 
that form the foundation of Kuhn’s thesis—namely normal science, 
paradigm and revolution—have entered the vocabulary of the social sciences 
and humanities and, indeed, the word paradigm has become something of a 
popular term. 34  One writer, listing Kuhn’s book in his hundred best 
nonfiction books of all time, has stated recently that the expression, 
‘“paradigm shift” has become a cliche [sic] of social and political change.’35 
 This diachronic viewpoint can in turn be contrasted with what might 
be described as a methodological approach to epistemology. Here the 
emphasis is rooted less in grand dichotomies such as the one between 
                                       
30 Ibid at 38. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions University supra note 26. 
33 Bachelard, G (1938) La formation de l'esprit scientifique [The Formation of the Scientific 
Mind] J Vrin. 
34 See eg Pheby, J (1988) Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction Macmillan at 
37–53. 
35 McCrum, R (2016) The New Review (The Observer), 19 June 2016 at 37. McCrum lists 
Kuhn’s book as number 21 in the column ‘100 Best Nonfiction Books of All Time’. It has 
sold, it is stated, more than 1.4 million copies. By way of contrast, McCrum lists Thomas 




synchronic and diachronic approaches and more in the actual methods 
employed by scientists. In the past a distinction was made between 
epistemology and methodology, but, as Blanché noted, it is difficult today to 
distinguish between the two.36 Or, put another way, there is no science 
without method.37 This is particularly true with respect to the work of Karl 
Popper (1902–1994) who refurbished the dialectical method in order to deal 
with the problem of uncertainty with regard to induction. Popper argued 
that a statement could be considered scientific only if it was open to 
falsification and that one role of a scientist was, accordingly, to attempt to 
falsify assertions and hypotheses advanced by others. 38  Statements that 
were incapable of being tested in this way would not form part of scientific 
knowledge and it is only by the denunciation of errors, and not by 
confirmation of seemingly acquired knowledge, that science progresses.39 
Critical method, in other words, is a fundamental aspect of epistemology. 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 
There is no reason in principle why some of these approaches and methods 
common to the natural sciences should not be applicable to the social, if not 
human, sciences.40 What are these different and conflicting methods? The 
most comprehensive epistemological response to this question has been 
provided by the late Jean-Michel Berthelot (1945–2006) who proposed a 
series of six schemes on intelligibility. 41  These schemes have been 
extensively discussed elsewhere,42 and so for present purposes it might be 
useful (at least for the moment) to identify only two since these two have, to 
                                       
36 Blanché L'épistémologie supra note 23 at 20–22. 
37 Barreau (1998) L'épistémologie [Epistemology] (4th ed) Presses Universitaires de France at 
51. 
38  See generally Popper, K (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery Hutchinson and Co 
(reprint Routledge 2002). 
39 Barreau L'épistémologie supra note 37 at 57. 
40 Berthelot, J-M (2006) ‘Épistémologie des sciences humaines’ [Epistemology of the Human 
Sciences] in Mesure and Savidan Le dictionnaire des sciences supra note 7 at 378. 
41  See in particular Berthelot, J-M (1990) L'intelligence du social [Understanding Social 
Society] Presses Universitaires de France. 
42  Samuel, G (2014) An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method Hart 
Publishing, at 79–95. 
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some extent, come to represent the fundamental epistemological and 
methodological difference between the natural and social sciences. This 
difference is expressed in the opposition between explanation and 
understanding.43 The first is founded on a causal scheme whereby one seeks 
to explain a phenomenon through the mechanics of causation inherent in 
the physical facts while the second is about sense and intentionality which 
cannot be explained as such but only understood.44 The ‘facts’ are a sign 
and their signification is a matter of hermeneutical interpretation. One is 
seeking their sense. The problem, of course, with this distinction, and which 
results in what can be seen as an epistemological weakness, is that 
assertions founded upon interpretation are not open to falsification in the 
Popper sense and thus may not even be considered scientific. They are, 
however, open to a dialectical scheme of intelligibility in which differing 
interpretative assertions are continually confronting each other in terms of 
dialectical oppositions which in turn engenders a critical approach perhaps 
seen as essential in the social sciences. ‘Explanations produce relations at a 
clearly defined level’, concludes Rudolf Makkreel, ‘whereas understanding 
uncovers interrelations which intervene at multiple levels.’45 
 In addition to these methodological issues there is also the problem of 
what might be termed paradigm or programme orientation. By this is meant 
that a researcher functions within what Thomas Kuhn has described as the 
paradigm of normal science; this is a period when scientists largely share 
the same methodological and epistemological outlook.46 They adhere largely 
                                       
43 Makkreel, R (2006) ‘Expliquer et comprendre’ [Explanation and Understanding] in Mesure 
and Savidan Le dictionnaire des sciences supra note 7 at 441; Berthelot ‘Épistémologie des 
sciences humaines’ supra note 40 at 380. 
44 Berthelot ‘Épistémologie des sciences humaines’ supra note 40 at 380. 
45 Makkreel ‘Expliquer et comprendre’ supra note 43 at 443. 
46 See generally Kuhn (1970), supra. In fact this reference to Kuhn is both helpful and 
misleading. It is helpful if one takes a quite wide definition of ‘paradigm’ so as to mean what 
might be described as a general world view. But it is misleading in the present context in 
that Kuhn himself used the term in relation to the natural sciences and to changes of 
paradigm that were drastic in their revolutionary effect; scientists working in the paradigm 
before the revolution would not be able to communicate with scientists working after the 
revolution. Given that such drastic revolutions are possibly not applicable in the world of 
social science, applying Kuhn’s paradigm notion to the social sciences must therefore be 
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to the same set of models and theories. When applied to the social sciences 
this idea of a generally shared ‘normal science’ is much more difficult to 
discern because of the plurality of methods and schemes of intelligibility. 
Consequently one finds that at any given moment different social scientists 
may well adhere to different ‘paradigm’ orientations.47 Some may think that 
there is such an entity as ‘society’ while others see only a mass of 
individuals.48 Some may think that social phenomena can be the subject of 
reductionist theories and (or) that there is an essential order (or system) that 
is inherent in such phenomena; others may see only complexity and 
chaos.49 Some may think that social science knowledge is no different, in the 
end, to natural science knowledge and thus transcends cultures; others may 
be of the view that all such knowledge is uniquely cultural and only 
cultural.50 Some may think that social science knowledge is grounded in an 
objective ontology while others are of the view that all such knowledge is 
entirely textual.51 These different paradigm or programme orientations often 
translate into particular schemes of intelligibility and so, for example, 
cultural and textual approaches usually operate within a hermeneutic 
scheme while a scientific outlook focuses on causality.52 An individualist 
paradigm usually translates into an actional scheme of intelligibility where 
the focus is on individual agents and their actions; a holistic outlook is often 
                                                                                                                       
treated with caution and that is why, perhaps, programme would be a better expression. 
47 Again it must be stressed that paradigm is being used here in a weaker sense than in 
Kuhn. 
48 See further Valade, B (2006) ‘Individualisme et holisme méthodologiques’ [Methodological 
Individualism and Holism] in Mesure and Savidan Le dictionnaire des sciences supra note 7 
at 620. 
49 See further Dupuy, J-P (2006) ‘Complexité sociale’ [Social Complexity] in Mesure and 
Savidan Le dictionnaire des sciences supra note 7 at 174. 
50  See further Muchielli, A (2006) ‘Scientisme’ [Scientism] in Mesure and Savidan Le 
dictionnaire des sciences supra note 7 at 1059; cf Abélès, M (2006) ‘Culturalisme’ 
[Culturalism] in Mesure and Savidan Le dictionnaire des sciences supra note 7 at 230. 
51 See further Ogien, R (2006) ‘Réalisme et sciences sociales’ [Realism and Social Science] in 
Mesure and Savidan Le dictionnaire des sciences supra note 7 at 963; cf Affergan, F (2006) 
‘Écriture et sciences humaines’ [Writing and the Human Sciences] in Mesure and Savidan 
Le dictionnaire des sciences supra note 7 at 354. 
52 These schemes are discussed in more detail in Samuel An Introduction to Comparative 
Law Theory and Method supra note 42 at 81-92. 
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behind structural and functional methods.53  The point that needs to be 
stressed, therefore, is that methods and orientations tend to be connected, 
even if the combination between reasoning techniques, schemes of 
intelligibility and orientations can vary amongst different social scientist 
researchers, whole groups of which are operating of course within different 
disciplines and sub-disciplines. 
 This reference to disciplines and sub-disciplines possibly renders the 
idea of different schematic levels—reasoning techniques, schemes of 
intelligibility and paradigm orientations—too schematic so to speak. 
Berthelot was sometimes more fluid in his description of currents and 
theories and subsequently talked in terms of functionalism, systemisation, 
structuralism, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, pragmatism, 
methodological individualism and so on.54 His main point, of course, was 
that all of these currents are partial and that in sociology no single theory 
has been able to impose itself. The result is that sociology has continually 
cultivated an epistemological reflection on its foundations.55 This reflection 
in turn has given rise to a kind of dialectical attitude—the critical approach 
mentioned earlier—in which the epistemology of the social and human 
sciences is a matter of grand oppositions. Explanation verses 
understanding, causes versus sense, and natural sciences verses sciences of 
the mind, said Berthelot, structure much of the epistemological debate 
today.56 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND LAW 
Given that law, in many universities in the common law world, is part of the 
social science faculty, does this discipline exhibit the same kind of 
dialectical tensions as those just outlined?57 The answer may well be that 
                                       
53 Ibid. 
54  Berthelot (2006a) ‘Sociologie’ [Sociology] in Mesure and Savidan Le dictionnaire des 
sciences supra note 7 1106 at 1108. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Berthelot ‘Épistémologie des sciences humaines’ supra note 7 at 380. 
57 This is not to assert that law is a social science: cf Samuel, G (2008) ‘Is Law Really a 
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there are a number of dialectical tensions within the discipline but perhaps 
these cannot really be appreciated until some wider questions about legal 
knowledge are broached. One should start therefore by asking a general 
question. Where does the discipline of law fit into the general vision of 
epistemology? Three approaches have been outlined. A synchronic viewpoint 
can focus upon what law is today within a timeless context. What 
constitutes the material that is ‘law’ and how is it differentiated from 
material that is not ‘law’?58 Is there, for example, a science of law and if so 
what are the postulates and principle that make up this science? A rather 
different question, of course, is whether law itself is a science and, if so, 
what exactly forms its object. A philosophical approach might examine the 
values and theories that motivate or act as foundations for the discipline. Is 
an unjust law a law? Does law have as its role the pursuit of justice and, if 
so, what is meant by justice? A diachronic approach should ask what law 
has been. How has legal knowledge been perceived in the past? How have 
the constituent elements of this knowledge been constructed, put together 
and developed over the centuries? How have theories and methods changed 
or evolved over time?59 These general epistemological approaches—and they 
are perhaps not exclusive—have, as we have seen, been fashioned within the 
context of the natural sciences but there is no reason why they cannot be 
relevant for law. 
 However these approaches and the questions that they generate 
cannot properly be pursued until legal knowledge itself has been more or 
less identified as an object (res). One should perhaps focus first on legal 
education.60 What do students in law schools learn? What approaches are in 
evidence in the typical law school?61 What is a first-year student entering 
                                                                                                                       
Social Science? A View from Comparative Law’ (2008) Cambridge Law Journal 288. The 
point being made here is whether law shares the same kind of epistemological tensions as 
the ones found in say sociology. 
58 Cf Bix ‘Law As An Autonomous Discipline’ supra note 3. 
59 See eg Schiavone Ius. L'invenzione del diritto in supra note 2. 
60 Bell ‘Legal Education’ supra note 3 (and references therein). 
61 For a recent historical and comparative analysis of legal education in the civil law and in 
the common law see: Freda, D (2019) ‘Legal Education in England and Continental Europe 
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her legal studies faced with in terms of the kind of knowledge she will be 
expected to handle and absorb over the period of her studies? These 
questions will in turn lead the inquiry towards the texts used in law schools 
with the result that the apparent answer to the legal education question is 
this. Legal knowledge is, at least in part, the knowledge to be found in the 
law books. 62  A major research work on legal epistemology would, then, 
probably need to undertake an exhaustive coverage of the world’s law 
textbooks, monographs and articles. What would such research likely to 
produce in terms of law as identifiable object? 
 Arguably the first-year student would become aware of three 
fundamental anchor points with regard to the knowledge she is about to 
tackle. First, the importance of classification and categories; the law degree 
will be divided up into a range of legal subjects and, as the studies proceed, 
it will become evident that these subject categories are based on various 
classification schemes, some conceptual and some empirical.63  Secondly, 
within each category there will be several fundamental concepts and (or) 
notions.64 In the law of property for example there are concepts such as 
ownership and possession; in the law of obligations (or alternatively contract 
and tort) there will be for instance the notions of consent and fault. Other 
concepts and notions such as right, duty, interest and so on will 
subsequently emerge from the different areas of law. Thirdly, and perhaps 
most controversially from an epistemological point of view, there will be 
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63 See Birks Examining the Law Syllabus: The Core supra note 10, and Birks Examining the 
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Presses Universitaires de France. 
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rules and principles.65 Indeed it is this latter notion that will probably be the 
most evident at any general legal knowledge level.66 Studying law is, it would 
seem, about learning and applying rules and principles to sets of factual 
situations and this learning will be facilitated not just by studying the rules 
themselves (say in a statute) but equally their interpretation and application 
in cases.67 When viewed from the position of texts, the student will probably 
see legal knowledge as being about reading statutes, cases and textbooks. 
This is where legal knowledge is to be sourced and found. 
 This of course is a somewhat simplified picture of legal knowledge.68 
But it arguably acts as a foundation for legal knowledge upon which a more 
sophisticated description of legal knowledge can be constructed. 69  Thus 
each category of law has generated not only definitional issues but also 
theory debates. What is the philosophy behind the law of tort? What 
constitutes property? How does private law differ from public law? The range 
of theory questions generated by each field of law are multiple and varied. 
The same is true of concepts. What is ownership? What amounts to 
consent? Indeed some concepts such as right and duty have risen above 
legal categories to become focal points for general theories. What is meant 
by a ‘right’? Is there a notion of an abuse of a right? As for rules and 
principles, these have provided the basis for whole theories of law.70 What is 
a legal rule as opposed to a non-legal rule? Is an unjust rule a legal rule? 
How do all the rules and principles relate to each other and are these 
relations fundamental to the definition of law? In short, the literature on 
these kinds of questions—and there are many of them—is huge and 
                                       
65 Rules are controversial as the foundation of legal knowledge simply because they beg the 
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constitutes not just legal knowledge but evidence of internal debates within 
the discipline of law. These debates in turn can be translated into tensions 
in that the various positions adopted within the debates often display 
different epistemological visions of law. 71  The claim being made in this 
present article is that it is these tensions that form the bedrock of a legal 
epistemology that might make sense to a social science theorist. 
 How might these tensions be articulated? Again one probably needs to 
embark upon an exhaustive coverage of the theory literature devoted to law 
or to aspects of law. But, again, one can ask what might such a research 
project reveal. Arguably it would reveal four principal areas of tension. The 
first is the general one to be found in epistemology, namely the opposition 
between a synchronic and a diachronic approach. This may at first sight 
seem a surprising debate given that very few of the graduates leaving law 
schools will have studied legal history in any depth. 72  However an 
exhaustive examination of all the legal literature will reveal that issues 
about law’s past are often to be found under the surface so to speak. 
Moreover there is arguably a renewed interest in this present century in 
what might be called historical jurisprudence.73 A second tension—and one 
of the most fundamental—is between formalism and realism (this latter 
term, it must be stressed at once, being understood in a wide sense). To 
what extent are the functions fulfilled by law part of legal knowledge itself? 
Are cases to be decided by reference only to some a priori formal legal model 
of say rights or legal axioms or are the social, economic or (and) political 
implications of any decision to be taken into account by the judges? 74 
                                       
71  For example Andrew Robertson has described the tension between formalism and 
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73  See eg Del Mar, M and Lobban, M (eds) (2016) Law in Theory and History Hart 
Publishing. 
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Should one take account of the psychology of judges or their social 
background? What is the relationship between law and facts? Indeed what 
constitutes fact for lawyers? A third tension is linked to this last one, but it 
deserves its own place so to speak because it can reach beyond the tension 
between the formal and the empirical. Is knowledge of law confined to some 
notion of ‘law’ or does it—should it?—embrace the law-makers themselves? 
Should a definition of law include a description of those who make the law? 
The fourth tension is one that has not been openly articulated in the 
literature but, as any diachronic approach will reveal, lies at the heart of 
law’s validity and scope. This is the tension between what might be called 
the authority and the inquiry paradigms. Are lawyers little more than 
narrow interpreters of official legal texts using techniques, usually in a 
rather simplistic fashion, imported from other disciplines? Is the research 
domain in legal studies severely limited by what constitutes the discipline’s 
texts and what are its acceptable methods? Should law as a discipline be 
compared to theology rather than to the social sciences? 
HISTORY AND ANTI-HISTORY 
Having identified these four areas of tension in legal epistemology—although 
again it must be stated that they may not be exhaustive—the next obvious 
step is to examine each of them in more detail. However, if only for reasons 
of space, a more fluid discussion might be more useful. It might be more 
useful because the tensions themselves can flow one into another which, in 
turn, produce a number of cross-currents and under-currents so to speak. 
This said, there is one tension that no epistemological account can ignore; 
this is the tension between past and present. 
 In the preface to perhaps the only work ever published in English that 
comes close to being a work of pure legal epistemology, Walter Jones wrote 
that even ‘to-day so many roads in the law lead us back to Rome by way of 
the Commentators on the Roman law’.75 Not surprisingly, therefore, the two 
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leading Post-Glossators, Bartolus (1313–1357) and Baldus (1327–1400), are 
given frequent references and quotation. Yet almost no civilian or common 
law graduate will ever have studied the works of these two jurists and, in 
contrast to the texts of Roman law, their major commentaries on Roman law 
have never been translated (save for some short pieces) into other European 
languages.76 Indeed there are not even easily readable Latin texts.77 This 
seems odd in many ways given that Bartolus provided one of the first, and 
most long-lasting, definitions of ownership; 78  and Baldus furnished the 
foundations of corporation theory, so vital to the development of 
constitutional and company law.79 However one of the ironies of legal history 
is that it consists of a progression of jurists and legal theorists who have 
propounded ahistorical (synchronic) models of law.80 This is not to say that 
there have not been historical schools of jurisprudence. But, as Jones 
pointed out, ‘the more widely the legal historian extends his field, the more 
convinced he will become of the impossibility and even absurdity of all 
attempts to formulate any concept of law’.81 This problem was overcome by 
abandoning history in favour of metaphysical formalism.82 One must rise 
above history, for the ‘very expressions “legal history”, “legal evolution”, have 
no meaning unless we distinguish law from its history or evolution.’83 The 
concept of law is a priori and formal; and, moreover, it must be a consistent 
harmonious whole not just free of internal contradiction but capable of 
providing an answer to every case subject to it.84 
 This kind of thinking gave rise to monistic rule model theories of law 
                                                                                                                       
(Preface). 
76 At least not to this present author’s knowledge. 
77  The original manuscripts are not just written in Latin but also contain endless 
abbreviations which only a specialist can follow with ease. 
78 See Bartolus In primam Digesti Novi partem Commentaria [Commentaries on the New Part 
of the Digest] D.42.2.17.1 no 4. 
79 Canning, J (1987) The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis Cambridge University Press. 
80 See generally Gordley The Jurists: A Critical History supra note 8.  
81 Jones Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law supra note 75 at 204. 
82 Ibid at 204–206. 
83 Ibid at 211. 
84 Thus Code civil [French Civil Code] art 4. 
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many of which attracted the name positivism.85 On the whole these theories 
tended to exclude the law-makers themselves, except as formal sources of 
legal rules. In other words the reasoning processes by which a judge came to 
a decision was either a matter of deductive or syllogistic logic or of 
interpretative discretion.86 The focus is on the model of rules or norms—or a 
model of ‘rights’—and it is this model that should determine, either directly 
or indirectly, the outcome of litigation disputes.87 
 However a synchronic approach need not exclude the law-maker. 
Ronald Dworkin (1931–2013), for example, adopted something of an anti-
historical approach in suggesting that just as one did need a knowledge of 
the history of mathematics in order to be a good mathematician, so one did 
not need a profound knowledge of legal history to be a good lawyer.88 It was 
a question of ‘attitude’ in turn founded on the structure of legal 
arguments. 89  Whether this analogy is exact is another question. The 
structural and conceptual basis of mathematics and the mathematical 
reasoning associated with it is an ‘attitude’ that can certainly be divorced 
from any historical dimension, but is the same true of law? Is the legal 
‘attitude’ one that has not been formed uniquely out of an historical 
intellectual process? Whatever the response to this question, it has to be 
admitted that a great majority of competent lawyers seem to have gained 
their competence without ever having had to study in any significant depth 
legal history. As Atias observed, there are a good many histories of law but 
law is passed off as having no history; it is studied and is formed outside of 
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time.90 Yet while Dworkin’s view undoubtedly fuels the tension between the 
synchronic and diachronic, his theory unashamedly embraces the law-
makers—the judges—within a theory of law. Law is interpretation.91 It may 
be that the judge has to construct a formal model, out of the precedents and 
statutory texts, within which the hard case can be ‘fitted’, but this model is 
not divorced from the judge, even if Dworkin has to create a fictional and 
superhuman version of this law-maker.  
 Donald Kelley, in contrast, approaches legal knowledge as a specialist 
in the history of law and the human sciences. When faced with the ‘what is 
history’ question he responded by saying that one might start by asking 
what history has been.92 This no doubt is one suitable starting point for 
legal knowledge as well. Indeed within the civil law tradition there have been 
many who have argued that a knowledge of the historical dimension of law 
is indispensable to an understanding of contemporary legal thought and 
practice.93 The diachronic is essential to the synchronic. But what should be 
the focal point of this history? As with history itself, the answer is likely to 
be texts of one sort or another. Yet what is special about legal texts through 
the ages is that many of the most notable ones have been attempting to 
escape from the past; from Gaius to the modern textbook it is a matter of 
stating the law as it is, divorced from any historical account as such.94 This 
divorce in turn was impossible to a certain extent because for many 
centuries legal scholarship in continental Europe was attached to Roman 
law. 95  But the jurists, especially from the sixteenth century onwards, 
provided in their commentaries and treatises what they considered to be a 
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restatement of law as a conceptual and coherent body of rules and axioms.96 
The legislature took the final step in this divorce process. Thus Professor 
van Caenegem starts his celebrated history of private law in Europe with the 
great ‘restatement’ of this area of knowledge, namely the Code civil of 1804. 
Here was, so many jurists thought, a ‘new beginning’ which ‘attempted to 
make the traditional role of legal scholarship superfluous, by forbidding 
doctrinal commentary on the codes, in the belief that the new legislation was 
clear and self-sufficient.’ 97  There is thus within history itself a tension 
between the diachronic and synchronic with the result that all attempts to 
restate legal knowledge in synchronic form soon become, themselves, part of 
the diachronic account of legal knowledge.98 
 Nevertheless a diachronic approach, as important as it is, cannot 
adequately account for the totality of legal knowledge, nor indeed can a 
synchronic ‘restatement’ of the law either in a code or in a textbook.99 
Certainly textbooks seem fundamental both to the learning process and to 
provision of legal information to practitioners and others, but common 
lawyers seemingly take the view that there is an important distinction 
between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’.100 This distinction has its direct 
source in the American Realist movement,101 although the division stretches 
further back and seems implicit in Maine’s comment that, during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, reform of the law meant reform of the 
law books.102 Maine was no doubt thinking more of the civil law—for the 
English legal literature of this period was of little note103—and while the 
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textbooks, even today, are far more central to what constitutes legal 
knowledge in the civil law tradition there is a growing feeling that there is 
perhaps less legal knowledge in textbooks than one might think.104 This 
said, both in the civil and common law traditions of today ‘text-books are 
important... as guides to the case-law with which they are concerned’. And 
‘if they are good they are more than mere guides, for they seek not only to 
arrange the cases systematically but to extract from them the general 
principles of the law and to show how those principles may be developed.’105 
Hidden in Jolowicz’s assertion is of course a methodological point: the 
textbook writer does not just descriptively state the law. He or she has to 
reason and to systematise and so the object legal knowledge can so easily be 
seen as nothing more than principles and systematisation. The law maker 
and the law actors are factored out of what constitutes legal knowledge.106 
REALISM (OR FUNCTIONALISM) VERSUS FORMALISM 
However it would appear that the textbook writer might well be in a 
somewhat different methodological world than the judge. Thus according to 
one Law lord: 
Your Lordships’ task in this House is to decide particular cases 
between litigants and your Lordships are not called upon to 
rationalise the law of England. That attractive if perilous field may well 
be left to others to cultivate. [...] Arguments based on legal consistency 
are apt to mislead for the common law is a practical code adapted to 
deal with the manifold diversities of human life, and as a great 
American judge has reminded us, “the life of the law has not been 
logic; it has been experience.”107 
Whether a Supreme Court judge would sum up the role of her court in this 
way today is perhaps open to question. Yet it must surely remain the case 
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that appeal court judges would emphasise dispute resolution over the 
rationalisation of the law. This is the distinction between judge and jurist.108 
Consequently when asking the question about what lawyers know it would 
seem that one of the first responses is to ask other questions. Is one talking 
about judge, practitioner, jurist, legislator, negotiator, mediator or what?109 
And, if so, should one be looking not just at what they actually do but at 
their backgrounds, their beliefs, their working environments and so on? 
 Perhaps one starting place is to reflect upon the distinction between 
‘law’ and ‘dispute resolution’ since this distinction is becoming ever more 
important with the growth of forms of alternative dispute resolution 
procedures (ADR), a trend that is as important in the civil law as in the 
common law. 110  Clearly knowledge of law and knowledge of dispute 
resolution are not synonymous, but where is the line of demarcation? 
Interestingly this question leads one on to an epistemological issue that has 
long worried comparative lawyers. To what extent can one use the term ‘law’ 
to cover dispute resolution processes to be found in very different cultures 
than those within the Western tradition? The worry for comparative lawyers, 
or at least contemporary ones, is that of legal imperialism: is one imposing 
an epistemological model—that of ‘law’ as traditionally understood in 
European thinking—on a culture that has no historical understanding of 
this European notion? If one were to adopt an extreme realist position—
namely that all dispute resolution processes are forms of ‘law’—then 
comparative law would generate one view of legal knowledge. Yet does this 
view accord with traditional Western legal theory? One can appreciate this 
problem even within the Western tradition. Does the common law notion of 
a ‘leading case’ have any relevance, say, in German law? Does Dworkin’s 
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chain novel analogy have any meaning for French lawyers and jurists?111 
What is so important about these comparative law issues is that they feed 
into fundamental epistemological debates within Western law itself.112 Are 
those who assert a strictly formalist view of legal knowledge—or indeed 
those who assert some form of realist theory—indulging in intellectual 
imperialism? 
 These kinds of question do not seem to worry some formalists. One 
rights theorist—that is to say a theorist who asserts that ‘[r]esolving the 
conflicts between the rights of one another does not depend upon wider 
social policies or goals, as rights do not take the justification for their 
existence from such concerns’113—has asserted that although ‘the Greeks 
literally didn’t have a name for “rights”, all of us at all times and places have 
them.’114 It is unlikely that a comparative lawyer, or indeed a legal historian, 
would make such a comment today not just because it runs the risk of 
intellectual imperialism but also because it begs a question about ‘law’ as a 
body of knowledge in itself. Can one say of an ancient society, by way of 
analogy, that although it had no word that gives expression to the modern 
notion of ‘science’, all humans have this notion as an object even if they are 
not conscious of it? One is looking at a practice—resolving disputes or 
constructing an irrigation channel—and then applying an a priori conceptual 
form. In the case of rights, this form is one that makes a complete 
separation between the key element in the conceptual structure, namely the 
‘right’, and any social function that this element may be said to have. The 
social function does not inform the definition. This tension is partly one of 
observation. The rights theorist is operating at a strictly individualist level 
and looking at the relation between two humans (or ‘as if’ humans, such as 
corporations); it is a matter of constructing a iuris vinculum (or whatever) 
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between two actors.115 The social realist (using the term widely) is operating 
at a much higher level. She is looking at humans as a collective entity and 
propounding a theory that operates strictly at this level.116 The historian 
operating at one level is unlikely to enter into a legitimacy argument with a 
colleague just because the latter is functioning at a different level. A book 
about wars in the twentieth century can happily co-exist with a work about 
a specific battle in one of the wars. Yet the level tension in law not only 
creates friction between theorists but gives rise to arguments about the very 
legitimacy of a theoretical approach.117 
 Steve Hedley sees this friction as arising from the difference between 
an internal and external point of view.118 This is helpful in that it indicates 
the context in which the authority paradigm has its role.119 An internalist 
considers the work of judge and jurist as work focusing on texts acting as 
the formal source of law; in turn these texts—legislation and reported 
cases—are considered by judge and jurist as having an absolute authority in 
the sense that the methods employed in analysing and applying them are 
limited by strict formal boundaries. The statutes and judgments can be 
criticised and interpreted, but their authority as ‘law’ cannot be questioned. 
This authority paradigm restriction has an important ideological dimension 
in that judicial decision-making should be both free from personal bias and 
orientated towards making the law as certain and predictable as possible. 
The authority paradigm in other words is part and parcel not just of the rule 
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of law principle but of justice itself. 
 It is of course easy to exaggerate the formalistic approach associated 
with this authority paradigm which in turn reveals another tension within 
legal knowledge. This is the tension between the language of the law itself—
the legislative text or the Supreme Court judgement—and the methods 
employed by those who are interpreting and applying these texts.120 There 
are real choices open to those who judge actual cases even if these choices 
are hidden behind apparently formalised reasoning processes.121  Thus it 
may be that at the level of methodology not only does formalism turn out to 
be more multi-dimensional than one might think,122 but equally there ‘exists 
a plurality of methods and of methodological models available to lawyers.’123 
However one should not underestimate the policing of this methodology. 
‘The legal profession and the legal academy [...],’ writes Andrew Robertson, 
‘provide a significant institutional constraint by policing (in textbooks and 
scholarly literature) consistency, coherence and doctrinal stability, and by 
scrutinising and criticising assumptions made by judges about the potential 
social and economic consequences of particular legal rules.’124 This remark 
is revealing. If the role of the ‘insider’ legal academic acting within the 
authority paradigm is largely to police the work of others, then this surely 
accounts for the isolation of many academic lawyers from the rest of the 
social and human sciences.125 Policemen make enquiries of course and all 
scientists and social scientists are subject to intense scrutiny of their 
methods. Yet such scrutiny is in the interests of the inquiry paradigm itself 
in that inadequate methods lead to unreliable empirical results. Legal 
policemen, in contrast, seem to be enforcing not the production of empirical 
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knowledge but the maintenance of a metaphysical—almost theological—
model (namely ‘law’) whose function is to ‘police’ society itself. 126  It is 
tempting to conclude that internalists are not scientists at all—either 
natural or social—but secular priests engaged in a struggle to enforce 
conformity at the level both of law and of law-maker. Some of the tensions 
within legal studies mirror the past struggle between orthodoxy and heresy 
in religions. 
 Of course the position is much more complex: there are different 
groups of players in the internal theatre of law. Accordingly it would be 
better to talk of a habitus where different groups of internalist lawyers 
function. 127  However these different domains are not isolated one from 
another. Academics often seek to influence judges while the latter might 
have to direct their mind to legislators when faced with an ambiguous 
statutory provision. These interactions themselves can generate certain 
kinds of knowledge, some of which can be captured either by textbooks—for 
example on statutory interpretation—or by other forms of publication. The 
legislator, although often motivated by research from other disciplines, must 
nevertheless express itself in terms of the printed normative proposition. 
Legislators, in other words, are likely to see law as a matter of rules. The 
judge, while no doubt accepting that law is certainly about rules, has to 
interact with the statute in a different way, for what is in issue is the 
resolving of a dispute between two parties. The academic as policeman 
might in turn argue that any dichotomy between rule and dispute resolution 
is a false one since the role of the judge is to apply the rule to the facts and 
that this is a matter—at least in easy cases—of syllogistic logic. Formalism 
masks both interaction and tension. 
 There is also complexity with respect to the internal (authority 
paradigm) and external (enquiry paradigm) dichotomy itself. There are many 
academics who operate in both theatres and who are able, for example, to 
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move their levels of observation with ease. In addition there are jurists who 
can work with proficiency in more than one discipline. Once one can stand 
outside the authority paradigm habitus one needs a different epistemological 
framework. But this of course brings one back to the tension between 
formalism and realism, the latter term being understood in a very wide 
sense (embracing perhaps all inquiry orientated approaches). Just as the 
researcher researching the sociology of the science laboratory might not be 
considered by those working in the laboratory as true ‘scientists’, so those 
lawyers working outside of the authority paradigm—or doctrinal law as it is 
sometimes called128—might not be considered true ‘lawyers’ or ‘jurists’. In 
fact, within the common law world, such a sharp dichotomy is seemingly not 
a characteristic to be found in many law faculties: few wish to extract law 
from its social context.129 Yet if one returns to the work of Robert Blanché, 
he observed that the sciences generally pass, in their development, through 
four epistemological stages. They start out from the descriptive and end up 
at the axiomatic, passing respectively through an inductive and then 
deductive stage. Law, at least within the civil law tradition, seems to 
conform to this pattern, arriving at an axiomatic stage with the nineteenth 
century German Pandectists.130 The American Realists helped destroy this 
axiomatic vision, but where does this leave the Blanché model? Or, more 
generally, as James Gordley asks: Ubinam Gentium Sumus?131 Steve Hedley 
has provided one convincing answer with respect to the committed 
internalist. It is back to the past. ‘When it comes to a detailed statement of 
the law of obligations,’ he writes, ‘it is striking how much of the modern 
                                       
128 See Jestaz, P and Jamin, C (2004) La doctrine Dalloz. 
129 Cownie, F (2004) Legal Academics Hart Publishing. 
130 See further Samuel, G (2003) Epistemology and Method in Law Ashgate at 63–71. On 
Pandectist thought see Jouanjan, O (2005) Une histoire de la pensée juridique en Allemagne 
(1800-1918) [A History of Legal Thought in Germany (1800-1918)] Presses Universitaires de 
France. The idea that Roman law could be reduced to a set of axiomata can be traced back 
to JG Heineccius (1728) Elementa Juris Civilis Secundum Ordinem Pandectarum [The 
Elements of Civil Law Following the Order of the Digest]; for extracts see Samuel, G A Short 
Introduction to Judging and to Legal Reasoning supra note 111 at 15–19. In fact, as has 
been mentioned, the expressions axiomata iuris and axiomatum are employed even earlier 
by Matteo Gribaldi in his De method ratione studendi (1558) at, for example, 17 and 31. 
131 "Where are we now?": Gordley The Jurists: A Critical History supra note 8 at 275–312. 
28 
 
vision of the internalists merely repeats the views of leading law teachers 
circa 1880.’132 If Professor Hedley is right, the dichotomy between formalism 
and realism suddenly takes one back into another great epistemological 
tension, namely between the synchronic and the diachronic. Having 
abolished history one can escape back into it with ease and, it would seem, 
without embarrassment.133 
 As Professor Hedley points out, this retreat into the past is odd. ‘Every 
other branch of human knowledge—including legal knowledge—has 
progressed immeasurably over the past century’ notes this author. And he 
adds that in ‘any other area, academics would be embarrassed at using 
much the same theories and attitudes as were advanced a century and a 
half ago, with nothing to show for the work of the intervening period except 
some minor updating.’ 134  Yet the oddness might well be part of legal 
knowledge itself in that it indicates how the authority paradigm that governs 
the internalist and formalist approaches has been in existence since the 
time of the Glossators. Non licet allegare nisi Iustiniani leges, said the 
medieval jurist Azo (1150–1230).135 As this assertion indicates, the authority 
in the medieval age attached to the text itself, but this was to give way in the 
sixteenth century to an authority that attached to mathematical 
rationality. 136  The fundamental rules of law—usually Roman law—were 
analogous to mathematical or geometrical axioms. 137  By the nineteenth 
century, in Germany, this thinking had matured into a highly systematised 
science of concepts and norms where a ‘jurist’s conclusions were to follow 
from authoritative texts rather than immutable principles, yet they must 
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follow deductively or they would not have the same authority as the texts.’138 
 One might think that the common law is different given that it formed 
outside of the Roman learning. But German thinking was hugely influential 
on the nineteenth century common lawyers as the latter moved away from a 
forms of action approach to one founded on the great European legal 
concepts.139 Moreover, as Peter Stein noted, English law, for all its other 
strengths, was weak on legal theory and thus ‘turned for inspiration to the 
current continental theories, necessarily based on Roman law’. 140  The 
authority paradigm, in short, is an essential feature in the history of both 
the civil law and the common law (or at least, with regard to the latter, from 
the end of the eighteenth century) and it is this paradigm that in many ways 
holds the key to the various tensions identified as underpinning legal 
knowledge. As for formalistic legal knowledge, it is accordingly trapped in an 
epistemological cycle of its own making and this is what renders it, in 
relation to the other social sciences, somewhat ‘odd’. 
CONCLUSION 
It would be idle to claim that this article has provided any kind of definitive 
single answer to the research question posed at the outset. Can social 
theory help the legal knowledge question? Indeed one aim of this article is to 
assert that there is no single answer to the knowledge question for several 
reasons. First, because there are different actors within the discipline of 
law—practitioners, judges, legislators, professors, legal administrators and 
so on—each of which will have a particular kind of legal knowledge. A 
solicitor who is an expert at negotiation, conveyancing, court procedures 
and the like will probably have no knowledge of, or interest in, the kind of 
debates about tort law philosophy going on between law professors. A judge 
in the family law court might well have different knowledge from a Supreme 
Court justice who has specialised during her career at the Bar in say tax law 
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or intellectual property. 
 Secondly, actually to assert what is or is not legal knowledge may well 
not just contradict knowledge familiar to comparative lawyers, but amount 
to a form of orientalism. ‘Orientalism as a discourse’, the jurist Teemu 
Ruskola has written, ‘entails the projection onto the Oriental Other of 
various sorts of things that “we” are not.’ 141  He argues that Western 
comparative lawyers have been coloured by their own legal mentalities when 
it comes to observing Asian legal systems which in turn has resulted in the 
representation of these systems as biased and stereotyped. Thus Western 
comparative law scholarship can often conclude that there is an ‘absence of 
law’ in these regions.142 Now of course this article has not examined this 
important comparative law thesis, but it is raised here only to emphasise 
that the actual question—what is legal knowledge?—is fraught with dangers. 
To try to assert some definitive thesis could simply amount to 
epistemological imperialism. The epistemologist who asserts that legal 
knowledge does not exist in certain traditions is in real danger of exhibiting 
colonial or orientalist attitudes. 
 A third reason is the one that has formed the substance of this article. 
Even within the Western legal tradition, it is, as has hopefully been shown, 
impossible to assert a definitive thesis as to what does (and does not) 
constitute legal knowledge. There is a taxonomy and terminology that 
constitutes legal learning and legal practice in the Western tradition of law 
and this no doubt forms an important aspect of the discipline. There is also 
the idea of a normative ontology expressed in terms of the existence of rules, 
norms, rights, duties and the like (plus the theories that accompany this 
ontology). In addition there are the physical institutions of law—the courts, 
the judges, the practitioners and so on. Yet beneath all of these terms, 
categories, concepts and institutions there is the problem of what validates 
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an assertion as a legal one. As various writers have argued, law is the object 
of its own science—in mapping terms there is no distinction to be made 
between map and territory143—and this means that correspondence with 
some external object is absent. This leaves only coherence and 
consensus.144 There is much literature on coherence in law and this was 
once seen as the key to legal knowledge,145 but realists argued that such 
thinking was transcendental nonsense and thus coherence as the 
epistemological foundation of legal knowledge no longer commands support 
from all in the legal community.146 
 What is left, therefore, are the tensions. What this article claims is 
that it is these tensions that form the common foundation of legal 
knowledge. What is legal knowledge? It finds its immediate expression, as 
has been said, in the introductory works and the textbooks used in law 
schools and in the teaching and syllabi of these schools. It also finds 
expression in the official texts of the law—that is to say in legislation and in 
the judgements. There may well be a set of skills and methods as well, 
although again this is an area of debate.147 But this textual expression, and 
possibly methods, is (are) only part of what amounts to legal knowledge, for 
not only are there forms of knowledge that go much deeper than these texts 
(as this article has hopefully shown) but forms of knowledge that are 
ambiguous and debated. There are no fixed boundaries since these 
boundaries are the subject of constant movement and debate. However 
these movements and debates can be seen as forums of knowledge in 
themselves. Perhaps an analogy can be made with the smuggler who 
constantly crosses a border pushing his wheelbarrow. The border guards 
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have equally constantly searched these wheelbarrows for the goods that they 
know he has been smuggling, but to no avail. They have of course been 
focussing on the wrong res just as focussing on what lawyers learn is 
probably the wrong object; the guards failed to see that it is the vehicle itself 
that should be the issue. The analogy with law is to be found between 
wheelbarrows and tensions. 
 Of course one can choose to ignore this wider tension environment 
and to retreat into a strictly internalist and authority paradigm viewpoint 
(however sophisticated) or one can embrace the wider environment and 
perhaps to reflect upon how legal learning might contribute to this more 
general social science environment. This is the general tension that now 
underpins legal knowledge in many law schools. But rather than argue 
about whether legal knowledge is restricted to some kind of a priori formalist 
model of concepts and (or) rules or whether it should take a much broader 
vision of the discipline is not an argument that the epistemologist can 
probably resolve. All that one can assert is that what should constitute the 
focal point for understanding legal knowledge are these kinds of tension 
themselves: for they are the structural foundations of social science 
disciplines and, even if law is not a social science, this does not mean that 
there are not lessons from social science epistemology that are relevant to 
law. In the end it must always be appreciated that social science 
epistemologists ‘are searching to fill a multidimensional space whilst the 
paths taken by the researchers are limited only to one dimension.’148 This is 
probably true of law as well. 
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